Need to Know

Originally posted July 3rd, lost by Blogger on July 4th.

By now most everyone has heard the controversy about publishing a study modeling the potential public health impact of a bioterrorism event involving contaminating the milk supply with botulinum toxin. The Department of Health and Human Services had asked the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences to delay publication of the paper, because it highlighted vulnerabilities to the dairy industry that the government thought might be useful to terrorists. Thankfully the Proceedings elected to publish the paper, which was based on publicly accessible information and contained several recommendations for increasing the security of the food supply.

While food producers in general are probably unwilling to have the safety of food highlighted in this manner, opening these issues up for public debate is a critical part of homeland security. Sadly, the government’s response to the terrorist threat to critical infrastructure has been to restrict public access to information, thus taking away the most effective tool for enforcing security in critical infrastructure (most of which is privately held) – public pressure.

The inattention to safety relative to the magnitude of the problem, along with penchant for secrecy, is the same whether we’re talking about the food supply or chemical manufacturing. With regard to chemical plant security, we’re still seeing conclusions such as this being published (in February 2005), more than three years after 9-11.

In contrast to the low probability of chemical terrorism, possible consequences for human health and the environment from such an event could be severe. Moreover, limited evidence suggests that chemical facilities may be “soft targets,” lacking in adequate safeguards against criminal and terrorist attacks.

Voluntary industry guidelines, originally thought to be the key to maintaining chemical security are no longer considered sufficient to keep the nation’s chemical plants safe from potential terrorist attack, according to the Department of Homeland Security. Regulations and enforceable performance standards are now seen as necessary. A recent report published by the Center for American Progress further highlights this issue:

More than three years after the attacks of 9/11, our nation's chemical manufacturing and transport facilities remain extremely vulnerable to terrorism. Voluntary approaches have failed to accomplish what our national security requires, leaving us with no choice: The administration must put aside its ideological resistance to federal action, overcome private sector inertia, force a change in the status quo, and put into place new safety measures. In this, the first in a series of papers on protecting our critical infrastructure, the Center for American Progress sets out a 12-month action plan to reduce the risks posed by the nation’s chemical facilities.

There might be more progress in these efforts if the public were more aware of the vulnerabilities and their consequences. Whether it realizes it or not, the government has a vested interest in public debate about how our society can be attacked, and what should be done about it. This represents the best way to bring pressure to both private industry (which controls most of the critical infrastructure such as chemical manufacturing and food processing) and government agencies to take protective measures.

More resources on chemical safety from OMBWatch can be found here.